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Abstract
For decades, some governments have fiercely opposed any statute of the Societas Europaea
that foresaw German-type co-determined supervisory boards. Considering firms as pools of
specific investors, we ask about the conditions that are necessary to secure the interests of
‘specific human capitalists’ in an efficient way, if the real capital owners’ right to residual
control does not solve the ex-post bargaining problems over the sharing of quasi-rents. We
disregard contract-theoretic approaches as solutions to the ex-post bargaining conflicts and
suggest a constitutional approach to this major problem in the theory of the firm. From a
constitutional perspective, the (non-executive) board members of the German Aufsichtsrat
(Supervisory Board) – unlike the Betriebsrat (Works Council) – essentially dispose only of
marginal, extremely symbolic, i.e., non-enforceable rights to represent worker investors.
Legally, however, these rights are to be used first in the interests of the corporation and only
secondarily in the interests of partial investors. Marginal and symbolic rights as well as
fiduciary duties will make a difference in distributive bargaining, if they are legally
imposed. Who is to be heard and to be involved in decision-making and what is counted as
a legitimate argument or action – these are basically questions of political culture that in
principle leave room for efficient international diversity. Option rights in the European
directive on the Societas Europaea should thus be considered as an apt and wise decision.
Zusammenfassung
Seit Jahrzehnten wehren sich einige Regierungen vehement gegen die Schaffung einer
Societas Europaea, welche mitbestimmte Aufsichtsräte nach deutschem Muster für
europäische Aktiengesellschaften ermöglicht. Indem wir Firmen als Zusammenschluss
spezifischer Investoren betrachten, fragen wir nach notwendigen Bedingungen, um die
Interessen spezifischer Humankapitalgeber effizient abzusichern, wenn das residuale
Kontrollrecht der Finanzkapitalgeber Ex-post-Verhandlungsprobleme über die Aufteilung
der Quasirenten nicht zu lösen vermag. Wir sehen von vertragstheoretischen Lösungs-
ansätzen zu Ex-post-Verhandlungsproblemen ab und empfehlen vielmehr eine konstitu-
tionelle Annäherung an dieses Hauptproblem der Unternehmenstheorie. Aus konstitu-
tioneller Sicht verfügen Arbeitnehmervertreter im Aufsichtsrat – im Gegensatz zum
Betriebsrat – lediglich über marginale und eher symbolische, d.h. nicht die Interessen der
Arbeitnehmerschaft zwingend durchsetzbare Rechte. Aus juristischer Sicht wiederum sollen
diese Recht in erster Linie im Interesse des Unternehmens und erst nachrangig zur
Durchsetzung von Partialinteressen verschiedener Investorengruppen genutzt werden.
Marginale und symbolische Rechte ebenso wie treuhänderische Pflichten verändern die
Ergebnisse von Verteilungsverhandlungen, wenn diese Rechte gesetzlich verankert sind.
Wer muss gehört oder in den Entscheidungsprozess mit eingebunden werden und was gilt
als legitimes Argument oder legitime Handlung – dies sind im Grunde Fragen der
politischen Kultur, die im Prinzip Raum für effiziente internationale Vielfalt lassen.
Optionsrechte in der europäischen Direktive der Societas Europaea sollten infolgedessen
als angemessene und weise Entscheidung angesehen werden.3
A. Introduction
Co-determination regulations have been the main area of conflict in the more
than 25 years of debates on setting up a uniform legal status for the European
public corporation (Societas Europaea). All recent proposals provide free
contracting about the degree of co-determination. Only in the case of failure to
reach a solution is a legal default position offered. After the British and Austrian,
the German government also suggested that in that case the farther-reaching
national co-determination model of the involved partners would apply (BREIT
1998). But in May 1999, even this compromise failed again in the European
Council of Ministers, repeatedly, on a veto by the Spanish government. What are
the possible benefits of co-determined boards that help to maintain this
controversy? Could mandatory co-determination even be efficient? (And why
would Germany be the only country to recognise the advantages of mandatory
co-determination in corporate governance?)
Most economists today will have a definite answer and consider the German
singularity as an inefficient aberration – reason enough for us to challenge that
view. Neither the few available empirical studies (cf. JUNKES/SADOWSKI 1999
for an overview) nor the appreciation expressed by lawyers (cf. KÜBLER 1994)
state a major impact of the board itself or of the employee representatives that are
imposed by law. Why then the impasse?
It would be interesting to follow up a remark by GOTTESMAN, who comments
laconically upon the 19
th century decision to treat suppliers of capital but not
suppliers of labour as “owners” of the enterprise: “The legal ordering was not
inevitable; it was merely conventional.” (GOTTESMAN 1990: 2792).1 However,
we will develop an argument not in terms of the histories of labour and corporate
laws in different countries, but, in order to understand the German insistence on
mandatory co-determination, we take as our point of departure the general
organisational problem of employees as inside investors. In explaining a
historical particularity, there is always the danger of becoming too idiographic or
of presenting ad hoc arguments. We try to avoid this risk by referring to general
theories of the firm and by looking for functional equivalents in American
corporate law – though again in a non-orthodox view. We start our reasoning –
which many may view as “tightrope walking” – with the assumption that firm-
                                             
1  We could also try to exploit the analogy to the less controversial protection of bank interests
via board representation (cf. TITZRATH 1997).4
specific human capital is generally important for German companies. We then
ask whether the fear of being disadvantaged in the ex-post bargaining over the
distribution of the jointly created value may be allayed in comprehensive
contracts. This is not to be expected. On the contrary, corporate governance is
often understood as a consequence of contract failure regarding the collective
decisions at hand: namely as a constitution, which provides procedural
representation and participation rights and imposes fiduciary duties. The
behavioural impact of such procedural rights and obligations of trustees will be
discussed. As the marginal character of the workers’ rights can never lead to
decisional impasses, we conceive them as establishing a bargaining or political
arena. Where reasoned action creates legitimacy, the legally created need to
argue and to comply with the rules of corporate citizenship may foster agreement
and support. Seen as part of a consensual corporate culture, the quasi-parity co-
determination of German supervisory boards may induce efficient levels of
specific investment. The legal default rules of recent drafts of the European
directive for the Societas Europaea take account of these nation- and company-
specific effects. Arguably then, the intended institutional fit is an efficient choice.
B. Co-Determination and the (Mal-)Functioning of
German Boards
The main duty of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) in the German two-tier
corporate governance system is to select and appoint the executive board
(Vorstand), to supervise it and, if necessary, to dismiss its members (§ 84 and §
111 AktG). Certain transactions of the executive board may be subject to the
supervisory board’s explicit approval. For public corporations with more than
2000 employees – which are our focus – the Co-Determination Act of 1976
prescribes a varying size of the supervisory board (12, 16 or 20 members)
depending on the number of the corporation’s employees. The composition is a
quasi-parity representation of shareholders and employees – “quasi” because in
the case of a tie, the chairman of the supervisory board, who is always a
shareholder representative, has a double vote. The employee side must include at
least one blue- and one white-collar worker, one managerial employee and two
trade unionists. The exact size of each group depends on the composition of the
whole corporation (§ 7 and § 15 MitbestG). The employee representatives
receive their mandate from the workforce. Shareholder representatives are5
elected at the general meeting of shareholders (§ 101 AktG). A single person can
hold up to ten supervisory board mandates – a regulation especially relevant for
shareholder representatives and trade unionists. The Corporation Law requires at
least four supervisory board meetings per year (§110 AktG), and usually there
are no more than this (cf. BERNHARD 1995: 311).
Practitioners view these regulations with ambivalence. During the recent merger
of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler, CEO Jürgen Schrempp expressed a positive
attitude: “Apart from tax law and other considerations, our positive experience
with the favourable underlying political and economic conditions and in principle
with co-determination in Germany (...) spoke in favour of choosing a German
Aktiengesellschaft.”2 But co-determined boards by no means necessarily or
always work well, as is shown by many newsworthy supervisory board failures
(THEISEN 1993).
The theoretical discussion about the efficacy and efficiency of co-determined
supervisory boards is also ambiguous. Referring to mandatory co-determination,
JENSEN/MECKLING (1979: 474) present a remarkably simple and straightforward
economic argument: “The fact that stockholders must be forced by law to accept
co-determination is the best evidence we have that they are adversely affected by
it.” If this reasoning was true, the legal dilution of property rights should lead to
inefficiencies (for an elaboration, cf. SADOWSKI et al. 1997: 25 n.). ROE (1998a)
even argues that mandated co-determination undermines widespread ownership
and, therefore, is to blame for the underdeveloped securities markets in Germany.
Some legal experts state an important role for the supervisory board as a whole:
“It is obvious that the supervisory board carries an essential, if not the central
role in the system of controlling management.” (BAUMS 1995:12). Others see its
role as marginal, if not irrelevant. KÜBLER (1994: 548) describes the supervisory
board as “typically weak”, since it is expelled from operating management, with
no discretion over its own personnel, therefore being dependent on management
or a majority shareholder.
For our own analysis of how the co-operation of physical and human capitalists
could be organised and legally protected by a co-determined supervisory board,
we will choose a resource-pooling or team-production perspective, bearing in
                                             
2  Report on the Daimler-Benz/Chrysler Merger and the State of the Business – Extraordinary
Shareholders' Meeting of Daimler-Benz AG in Stuttgart, 18.9.1998.6
mind that its role is somehow similar to the one of non-executive or outside
board members for American corporations.
C. Supervisory Boards in the Theory of the Firm
I. Firms as Pools of Specific Investors
1. The Importance of Specific Human Capital for the Competitiveness
of German Firms
There is a widespread understanding that the intensity of specific human capital
and organisational capital investments is a major growth factor in industrialised
economies, particularly in those with negligible natural resources like Germany.
Economic theories of endogenous growth stress capital-skill complementarities
(e.g. PRESCOTT/BOYD  1987). Sociological studies of “international business
systems” underline the importance of legal and political regimes to foster
specialised quality production. This production policy is often ascribed to
German companies, by providing skills, in-company voice institutions, and
functioning labour markets and by tempering “short-termist” financial markets
(e.g. LANE 1995, STREECK 1991 for Germany).
Theories of resource based business strategies reflect a similar concern for the
intangible sources of competitive edge. Specific, if not tacit organisational
knowledge is thought to create major strategic advantages, since learning,
positive scale effects and complementarities are hard to imitate or to catch up
with. The more such synergies are based on company-specific arrangements of
co-ordination, co-operation and compromise, the less visible, the less transferable
and therefore the more advantageous they should be (cf. SCHNEIDER 1999).
Current management “philosophies” and human resource management texts even
demand that employees not only should be viewed as investors who possibly
embody important specific human capital, but also that they should be
empowered to become “co-entrepreneurs”. WUNDERER (1999) would like to see
only minor differences between sub-contractors and “co-entrepreneurs”, he
states: “Anyone who wants his employees to become lasting co-entrepreneurs
must consider them as partners, and he must refrain from using them like an
owner of investment goods.” (WUNDERER 1999: 123).7
For our analysis, we take for granted that employees do (often) invest into
company-specific human capital to a major degree, that those investments are not
negligible for corporate performance, and that their willingness to engage in
specific investments depends on their ability to reap future benefits.3
2. Specific Investments and the Theory of the Firm
According to the seminal article presented by COASE (1937), the distinguishing
feature of firm transactions as opposed to market transactions is the suppression
of the price mechanism. Instead, resources are allocated through power or
authority, with underlying contracts to establish the relationships between
different parties within the corporation. If the contracts between physical and
human capitalists were complete, there should be nothing unique to the set of
constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the rents generated in the
course of the relationship – the corporate governance system (cf. ZINGALES
1998: 497). In fact, there would be no ex post bargaining at all and corporate
governance would not differ from contractual governance – hence the firm would
be nothing else than a “nexus of contracts” (ALCHIAN/DEMSETZ 1972) – and
contract theory would be the appropriate theoretical tool.
WILLIAMSON (1985) already noted that the more specific the investments within
the firm are, the more incomplete the underlying contracts will be. When
employers and employees undertake co-specific investments, they find
themselves in a situation of bilateral monopoly: They cannot completely contract
ex ante upon the division of the return of their investments – the quasi-rent.
Therefore they face the threat of an ex post-expropriation of their piece of the pie
by the other partner who may happen to be more powerful at the moment of
bargaining. One source of power stems from the “residual right of control”
(HART 1995: 30), the right to make decisions in situations not covered by the
initial contract, the right that establishes authority in a relationship between the
principal and the agent.4 This “network of specific investments that cannot be
replicated by the market“ (ZINGALES 1998: 498) is the economic core of a firm, it
                                             
3 R OBERTS/VAN DEN STEEN (2000) and ITAMI (2000) argue in favour of similar premises.
4  The residual right of control does not necessarily mean the same as residual income rights.
Top-managers are often paid on a profit-sharing basis, so they have a residual income right.
Nevertheless, the residual right of control is held by the stockholders, since they have the
right to decide, e.g. about the dismissal of the managers (c.f. HART 1995: 63 nn.)8
is more than just a nexus of comprehensive contracts – and it demands another
type of theory than the theory of comprehensive contracts.
Just to draw on one extreme example of the incompleteness of even explicit
labour contracts that are intended to contractually protect specific human capital
investments: For so-called (collective) employment guarantees, the lawyer
EHMANN (1994: 189) concludes that “the final reason for the disobliging
character of employment guarantees is that these guarantees cannot be binding in
a market environment, since unforeseeable circumstances may arise for either
side”.5
3.  From Contractual to Constitutional Theories of the Firm
Given the shortcomings of incomplete contracting in offering “securitisation-
mechanisms”6 for co-specific investment returns in specific bilateral situations,
CHE/HAUSCH (1999: 125) state that “if committing not to renegotiate the contract
is impossible, then contracting has no value, i.e., the parties cannot do better than
to abandon contracting altogether in favour of ex post negotiations.” Their
analysis is based on the assumption that co-specific investments are not purely
“selfish”, i.e., generate a direct benefit only for the investor, but are
“cooperative”, that is either generate a direct benefit only for the trading partner
(purely cooperative) or for both the investor and the trading partner (hybridly
cooperative). This conclusion as well as the fact that courts generally seem to be
unwilling to enforce non-renegotiation clauses (ibid.: 132) makes the under-
investment problem difficult if not impossible to solve on a contractual basis.
Agents who must rely on the exit threat to protect their rents will avoid
specialising their resources in order to maintain the credibility of their exit threat.
A solution should therefore be to accord the residual right of control to agents
who do not negatively influence the degree of specialisation in the team. Who
could that be and how could that be achieved? If specific contractual
arrangements fail to work, one should have at least procedures and a constitution
                                             
5  “Der letzte Grund für die Unverbindlichkeit von Erklärungen, die den künftigen Bestand
eines Betriebes betreffen, ist also der, daß betriebliche Bestands- und Standortgarantien in
einer marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnung im Falle veränderter Umstände keinesfalls Bestand
haben können.” (EHMANN 1994: 189).
6  The word “securitisation” usually describes routines to protect the creditor of a loan with
collateral in case of the debtor’s default. Such attempts emerged during the 1980’s (see e.g.
SAUNDERS 1997: 600 n.). We transfer this idea to specific investments, especially specific
human capital investments.9
for running the organisation and sharing the gains. Constitutions set the rules of
the game: who is a member, allowed and obliged to what, the terms of
separation, etc. Writing a constitution by the investors-to-be means bargaining
about the constitution between them, and that creates the same problems of
potentially inefficient results as ex post bargaining about investment rents. How
then can spontaneous bargaining about a corporate constitution lead to a result
that resolves the problems of bargaining about rents?
In distributional conflicts about contractually unprotected quasi-rents, it is at least
optimistic, if not naive, to expect an efficient voluntary agreement about the
firm's constitution. A selfish rational agent will prefer a constitution that
strengthens his absolute position in ex post bargaining, even if this is detrimental
to the firm value. One cannot then expect an efficient constitution of the
corporation as a result of a bargaining process between co-specialised investors.
Investors will find themselves locked in a sub-optimal position. Are legal
interventions an efficient way out?
II. Institutions for the Efficient Protection of Non-Contractible
Investor Interests
Let us take a look at the role of legally mandated “mediators”. In order to
maximise the corporate value-added, ZINGALES (1998) proposes the involvement
of a third party. It could determine the level of specialisation of resources and
secure the appropriate share to each investor without carrying the costs of
specialisation. Being a third party legally obliged to the common interest of all
investors and definitely not being the agent of one single investor (investor
group) makes that third party a trustee for the whole group of investors that is the
firm.
It is rarely denied that a certain legal protection is necessary for outside investors.
Their investment “... is sunk and nobody – especially the managers – needs
them” (SHLEIFER/VISHNY 1997: 748). As a detailed contract enforcement is
impossible, situations could abound in which “managers constantly threaten
shareholders (...) to take ever less efficient actions unless they are bribed not to
(ibid.: 743)”. To reduce such disincentives, compulsory legal protection of
shareholders, in particular minority shareholders, are considered necessary in
most countries: the right to leave and to be compensated, minimal membership10
rights, the right to participate in shareholders assemblies, to appeal rights and the
right to sue other partners for not keeping their promises, for instance.7
We will use a similar argument for the possible justification of the German co-
determined supervisory board. In order to avoid an ad hoc rationalisation, we use
the US corporate governance system – which is often held to be superior to the
German system (ROE 1998a) – as a reference and we identify mediating or
trustee relationships in the governance of US corporations. Looking for
functional equivalents in Germany, we turn to supervisory boards as institutional
attempts to secure or “securitise” specific investments.
1.  The Role of Non-Executive and Outside Board Members in US
Corporate Law
Neglecting differences in corporate law between the states, the basic model of the
US corporate law separates executive and supervising functions within one single
board. Commonly the chief executive officer is also the chairman of the board,
which gives him considerable autonomy and influence; other managing officers
also belong to the board as executive directors (cf. BAUMS 1995: 14). The greater
share of the board usually consists of non-executive, or outside, directors.8 The
shareholders’ influence on the election of non-executive directors is far from
substantial. Often the so-called nominating committee proposes new members of
the board. In the general meeting, the board presents the nominating committee’s
recommendations for election, but the shareholders have very little actual
influence: “shareholders almost always vote for the slate proposed by
management. Moreover, this slate is approved by, if not chosen by, the very CEO
these directors are supposed to monitor” (HERMALIN/WEISBACH 1998: 96).
                                             
7  In Germany, such claims are nowadays brought forward with verve, e.g. by WENGER/
HECKER/KNOESEL (1997). More hesitantly, however: WALTZ (1993: 62ff.), who defies not
only the noncontractability assumption, but also the need to suppose an interest of the
corporation itself to limit opportunistic behaviour of majority partners and managers. Since
Wenger advocates minority shareholders' protection, he surprisingly does not accept the
necessity to protect human capitalists. On the contrary, he even sees massive inefficiencies
resulting from certain worker protection arrangements (see e.g. WENGER 1989,
MONISSEN/WENGER 1989). Nor do SHLEIFER/VISHNY (1997) ascribe to employees the
same need for legal protection as they do in favour of financial investors: “The employees ...
get paid almost immediately for their efforts, and are generally in a much better position to
hold up the firm by threatening to quit than the shareholders are” (ibid.: 751).
8  Referring to a survey from 1990, CHARKHAM (1994: 188) states that 86 % of manufacturing
industry boards and 91 % of the remainder consist of outside directors.11
In a recent paper, BLAIR/STOUT (1999) develop the idea in the work of Zingales
that US Boards, and in particular the outside members, must be understood as
trustees of all specific investors, whose legal responsibility is to mitigate the fears
of expropriation in ex post bargaining. Being fully aware of the scepticism that
the effectiveness of any demand for fiduciary duties will raise in any modern
economists’ mind, well trained in the principal-agent theory, BLAIR/STOUT
(1999: 111) self-confidently claim: “Far from raising a problem, this arrangement
may be an ingenious, if second-best, solution to the contracting problems
inherent in team production.”
One idea of regulating trust relationships is “(...) that the basic rule should ensure
that the interests of the trustee do not determine the solutions adopted”
(GRUNDMANN 1998: 480). The obligation to act completely altruistically is
unqualified, if a trustee did not pay for the assets he was entrusted with. “The
gratuitous nature of the transfer justifies that such a duty be imposed by the law.”
(ibid.: 493) Where there are several settlors, it may be difficult to weigh their
interests, but the duty to purely altruistic standards remains (ibid.: 492).
What kinds of fiduciary duties are made explicit in US corporate law? First of all
“the duty of loyalty” which prohibits any self-dealing and reaping of corporate
opportunities; secondly, “the duty of care”, which requires members to act in the
best interests of the corporation, including employees, creditors, and the
community. According to the “business judgement rule” board members cannot
easily be made liable to shareholders, but “... under certain circumstances, the
law grants other stakeholders in the firm standing to sue directors for a breach of
fiduciary duty” (BLAIR/STOUT 1999: 150). Especially in the case of insolvency,
the interests of shareholders and creditors or employee investors no longer
coincide, or, to put it differently, shareholder interests no longer represent the
interests of the coalition of investors.9
It is hard to imagine that these legal obligations are fulfilled when there is too
close a relationship between certain board members and certain interest groups
forming the coalition that makes up the firm. From this point of view, it seems
justified that the board of directors has a wide margin in deciding what is best for
the firm. According to their – presumably unorthodox – reading of US corporate
                                             
9  Many of these problems are matters of business judgement, not well suited for court
decisions, cf. WILLIAMSON’S (1991: 164) notion of the law of forbearance ruling within
firms: “Access to the courts being denied, the parties must  resolve their differences
internally. Accordingly, hierarchy is its own court of ultimate appeal.”12
law, BLAIR/STOUT  (1999:  135) regard in particular the non-executive board
members as “trustees of the corporation itself ... whose job is to balance team
members’ competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough
that the productive coalition stays together”.
Recently, shareholders in the US felt put at a relative disadvantage, and they tried
to gain more influence. Such “shareholder activism” led to certain changes. The
new possibility, for instance, of hostile “proxy contests”, gives shareholders a
more direct influence on the election of directors. But in general, such
modifications have not changed the situation substantially. MONKS/MINNOW
(1995) state that even in the rare case of proxy contests, the nominating
committee's proposition is accepted in 82 % of the cases. After surveying 20
empirical studies on the impact of shareholder activism on values, earnings,
operations, and governance structures of US firms, Karpoff concludes that some
firms have made small changes in their governance rules, but he sees little
evidence that these activities have on average increased firm value or had much
effect on operations (KARPOFF 1998: 27).
2.  Fiduciary Duties of the German Supervisory Board
It is difficult if not misleading to compare single elements of the US and the
German corporate governance system (BAUMS 1995: 15, ROE 1998b). First, the
supervising body Aufsichtsrat is legally separated from the managing body
Vorstand. Joint membership is not allowed (§ 105 AktG). Second, shareholders
elect, not only legally, but actually their representatives in the Aufsichtsrat.
German banks are allowed to be owners of corporations, and they are usually
authorised to vote on behalf of diffuse shareholders (due to the so-called
Depotstimmrecht). Managing and supervisory boards therefore cannot be
expected to be as intertwined in Germany as in the US.10 Finally, since half of the
supervisory board members are not elected in the general meeting but sent by the
employees, the German Aufsichtsrat is a more heterogeneous group than the
American board of directors – although union representation is not altogether
alien to American boards (HUNTER 1998). It is unlikely that the members of the
                                             
10  It should be noted that Germany has seen a shareholder activism movement similar to that in
the US. Some authors even argue that – despite the fact that the Aufsichtsrat is a more
heterogeneous group in regard to non-executive directors – some observers have the
suspicion of board coalitions between managers and employees conspiring to exploit
shareholders (e.g. WENGER/KASERER 1998).13
(at least) two competing interest groups in the Aufsichtsrat forget about their
different origins and interests. How can this heterogeneity and the resulting
conflicts be overcome?
It should not come as great surprise that German corporate law requires fiduciary
behaviour from the members of the corporate bodies, similarly to the US
regulations. Both the members of the Aufsichtsrat and the Vorstand are “trustees
of others interests” (KÜBLER 1994: 232).11 Mülbert leaves no doubt either: “As
the collegial body supervisory board is under the obligation to serve the interest
of the corporation, it is this corporate interest that each member of the
supervisory board has to accept as the basic behavioural guideline” (MÜLBERT
1996:115) and furthermore: “When voting, the member of the supervisory board
has always and exclusively to vote in favour of the lasting interest of the
corporation, even if this conflicts with his private interests”; finally: “The fact of
being delegated by some group does not lead to any differentiation of
obligations.” (ibid.: 116)
The German law explicitly states the obligation to mediate between shareholders
and employees; it works on the assumption that only as long as a compromise is
achieved, the corporation can serve the interests of any party, “because otherwise
it would decay” (MERTENS 1977: 277).12 But under the usual economic
assumptions, it is hard to believe that board members representing different
stakeholder groups indeed act as trustees of the whole corporation – maximising
total wealth – in the face of relatively effective group ballots. Without further
elaboration, it is hard to see how non-contractible specific investments could be
secured in this way.
In other words, when do we expect that each of the investor groups sets aside its
partial interests and complies with its fiduciary duties?
                                             
11  “treuhänderische Sachwalter fremder Interessen”.
12  Even the stockholder interest in a narrow sense is not the sum of the interests of different
stockholders, ‘... but a compromise between stockholders of different investment horizons,
between speculators and savers, between entrepreneurial stockholders and rentiers’
(MERTENS 1977: 276).
Auch das Gesellschafterinteresse im engeren Sinne ist nicht die Summe der
Anlegerinteressen, “...sondern ein Kompromiß etwa zwischen lang- und kurzfristig
interessierten Anlegern, zwischen Spekulanten und Sparern, zwischen unternehmerisch und
kapitalistisch orientierten Gesellschaftern“ (MERTENS 1977: 276). Here, the company
interest includes the interests of employees and the task of mediating between the interests
of shareholders and of employees. If this mediation process fails, …”the company cannot
operate to the advantage of either participant, because otherwise it would decay”. (ibid.
277).14
3.  Incentives for Fiduciary Behaviour of the Supervisory Board
We distinguish between economic incentives and legal sanctions to induce
fiduciary behaviour of all board members.
Monetary Incentives
To align diverging interests, the principal-agent theory characteristically suggests
the implementation of a profit-based remuneration. The Aktiengesetz does allow
for such a compensation (§ 113 AktG).
If shareholder representatives own major shares of the company stock, their own
profit interest will probably be a strong direct incentive to control management.
In widely held corporations, the control incentives for the shareholder
representatives can be expected to be weak. Furthermore, a certain degree of free
rider behaviour can be assumed. Often “shareholder supervisors” do not even
own shares themselves, but act on behalf of a corporation which holds shares in
the corporation to be controlled. Therefore a rise in profits is hardly a strong
incentive for shareholder representatives. Employee representatives, in turn, will
have a considerable direct interest in monitoring management activities, since
lasting job stability as well as wage premiums can be expected only in well
managed companies.
In German practice, one can observe fixed as well as profit-based remuneration
schemes (KNOLL/KNOESEL/PROBST 1997). It would be hasty to maintain that
fixed compensation schemes are unable to provide incentives. In some
companies, the fixed amount is reset annually in the general meeting, therefore
presenting at least a theoretical motivational impact. More often, however, the
directors’ percentage is increased according to a rule provided by the company’s
articles of association – independent of the supervisors’ performance.
(KNOLL/KNOESEL/PROBST 1997).13
                                             
13  The average compensation for supervisory board members was about 17,000 DM per year
in 1992. This figure differs strongly between industries and also between corporations.
Banks and insurance companies are quite generous, e.g., the average compensation was
59,270 DM at the large German banks. Because of the possibility of accumulating up to ten
of those positions, one can earn quite a lot of these sideline jobs, e.g. five supervisors earned
more than half a million DM in 1992 (cf. Wirtschaftswoche Nr. 40, 1995: 66).
The effect of the compensation on employee representatives activities can also be expected
to be rather small, since at least union members keep only up to 5100 DM of their annual
director’s compensation. The rest is handed over to the Hans Böckler Foundation, and there
are tendencies to take away all the compensation received by union delegates.15
In their empirical study, Knoll, Knoesel and Probst came to the conclusion that
supervisory board remuneration in Germany does not provide any relevant
incentives.
Incentives by Legal Sanction
In Germany, the statutory liability of the members of the supervisory board
seems to be very extensive (§ 147 AktG). All members of the supervisory board
are collectively liable unless individual members can proof their own innocence
(§ 93 AktG). However, there has not been a single conviction of a supervisory
board or its members for the last 50 years (THEISEN 1998: 264). A board reform
from 1998, however, strengthens the enforcement mechanisms for board member
liability (HOPT 1998: 255-6).14 The old Aktiengesetz granted the right to sue the
whole supervisory board or individual members only to the executive board or to
individual shareholders with 10 % of the shares or at least two million DM of the
nominal value of the shares (THEISEN 1998: 264). With the new legislation,
ownership of 5% of shares is sufficient to sue board members for damages to be
paid to the corporation, the other conditions remaining unchanged. A law suit can
be filed only upon suspicion of grossly negligent behaviour (“grobe
Pflichtverletzung”) (cf. HOPT 1998: 256). Up to last year, statutory liability was a
weak incentive in the German corporate governance system. We doubt that the
reforms will bring a major change.
Beyond those generally low-powered and laggard incentives for fiduciary
behaviour to act in the corporation’s interest or in the interest of the pool of
specific investors respectively, what else could mitigate the problems of team
investments? We agree that employee representatives – like bank representatives
– in the Aufsichtsrat make this body heterogeneous and perhaps cumbersome, but
that legally constituted body at least establishes a non-voluntary forum for ex-
post bargaining. In bargaining, much can be gained by an arena for the regular
exchange of information, the articulation of interests and the need for reasoned
action. The bargaining procedure should meet further conditions to avoid high
bargaining costs or even bargaining failure in the sharing of quasi-rents.15
                                             
14  These recent legal changes – known as KontraG – attempt to strengthen the supervisory
board as a whole.
15 K NIGHT (1992) points out that distributional conflicts and their solution are at the origin of
many kinds of legal institutions and often are not the results of bilateral negotiations, but
rather resulting from “third-party power”.16
D. Bargaining under Marginal and Symbolic Rights and
Duties: The Co-determined Board as a Political Arena
In German as in US corporate law, shareholders in general “... are seen in the
best position to represent the interests of the coalition that comprises the firm”
(BLAIR/STOUT 1999: 143).
In times of crises or change, however, one faces the possibility of unforeseen
externalities. Plant closure decisions, although profitable for shareholders, may
destroy workers’ share in quasi-rents without compensation. Mandatory board
representation could at least ensure that workers can voice their non-contractual
claims16 and perhaps their resistance against “theft” by the breach of trust
(implicit contracts) in hostile take-overs (cf. SHLEIFER/SUMMERS 1988). But
when legitimate claims of employee investors are neglected, their voice is the
more likely to make a difference if it is raised collectively and must be heard
legally. This right is essentially constituted through co-determined supervisory
boards.
Though legal in nature, board representation rights are usually not brought to the
courts. Instead, they change bargaining positions in the political arena, in which
the common investors meet. The simple act of legally constituting an actor who –
although in principle being unable to ever reach a majority – not only can cast his
vote, but also has to be heard and has rights to be informed and consulted, does
make a difference compared to pure market-power-based bargaining
relationships, all the more so where, as in German boards, the norm of unanimity
of formal voting prevails. Compromising is apparently often understood as a
precondition for specific investments in continuing relationships.
It is worth noting how the political interactions in supervisory boards usually
evolve. There is general consent that the Chairperson of the Board may exert a
major influence during the informal preparations of formal board meetings, and
he has to come to terms himself with the Vice-Chairperson, who by law is one of
the employee representatives and who in fact is very often chairperson of the
(group) works council – thus vested with substantial powers and endowed with
detailed insider knowledge. The informal contacts of the very few board
                                             
16 F REEMAN/LAZEAR (1995) and FRICK (1997) attribute major efficiency advantages to legally
mandated employee representations as their credibility to report authentically bad news
should be much higher than that of employer-enthroned employee representatives; such
credibility would save unnecessary quarrels and time.17
members who prepare the formal meetings certainly constitute the core of the
board. In such a non-anonymous, small group reliability in keeping one’s
promises counts as long as a common will to bridge conflicts of interest prevents
purely ritual communications. The legal duties of discretion and the other
fiduciary duties support some degree of openness in communications between
the different groups. OSTROM/WALKER (1997: 66) summarise their findings on
arrangements to provide efficient amounts of local public goods: “As we have
found in both field and laboratory settings, nonbinding, face-to-face
communication can be a very effective institution for facilitating cooperation”.
This is also true for boardroom performance, as is shown by WESTPHAL (1999)
and MCNULTY/PETTIGREW (1999).
If neither monetary incentives nor the liability threat are sufficient to guarantee
adequate control, the reputation of the supervisory board representatives might be
the decisive motivator. Misconduct reduces the probability to be re-elected onto
the same supervisory board and perhaps the chances of being elected to other
boards. It is also conceivable that future career opportunities are hampered. A
supervisory board member would presumably work the harder the more he stood
to lose in the case of a revealed control failure.
The possibility of being part of a certain group, i.e. an “elite”, might be another
incentive to work hard (cf. ALBACH 1988: 208 ff.): “The co-ordination elite co-
ordinates the single interests of the social groups to what one could call the
public interest. ... As the co-ordination elite of the economy I define that group of
individuals who meet frequently in different supervisory boards. ... The co-
ordination elite is open. There are constant new entrances into the elite and
constant losses of its membership. ... If the member of the co-ordination elite
loses the confidence of its constituency, then the affiliation to the elite ends, even
if the official status to a specific job is unchanged. ... This is not done by a formal
act, but informally. The member loses his communication relations.”17
Even under the exaggerating assumption that all co-determination rights are only
ceremonial and symbolic, invoking more than guaranteeing “the interest of the
corporation itself”, one should not a priori infer the meaninglessness of these
unenforceable rights for bargaining outcomes. As Niklas Luhmann once
suggested, law first of all has an impact on what is to be expected by others, and
indirectly only influences what they will do. Purely symbolic regulations or
                                             
17 W INDOLF (1994: 88ff.), having identified these networks, also empirically stresses the
concentration of power, but speaks, however, of “cliques” instead of “elites”.18
constitutions would per definitionem lack any legally normative power, but they
can have an impact on collective decision-making “that is not specifically legal
in nature” (NEVES 1998: 51). It is exactly the meaning of symbolic and exhorting
constitutional texts to find formulas that bridge conflicting interests.
“Compromising by formula” or “soft law” may result in wishful thinking or
ideological camouflage. On the other hand, ceremonial clauses may help to keep
in mind the common interests of the conflicting parties, i.e., the norms and duties
required for or at least conducive to the common endeavour. State constitutions
as well as guidelines for corporate behaviour often have such programmatic,
educational functions.18 Likewise, “the ponderous language of moral censure in
fiduciary cases can wound the defendant” (COOTER/FREEDMAN 1991: 1073).
Whenever action is influenced by perceptions and attitudes of what is to be
considered a focal point or what is legitimate, it is scarcely surprising and almost
tautological that a common history and a common legal tradition shape the
symbolic expression of standards or norms of harmony. For the German co-
determined board, it would be rash to infer its inefficiency or its evolutionary
inferiority from its international singularity. The latest draft directive of the
Societas Europaea would have allowed for national and company options to
form boards with or without co-determination. It thus showed comprehension not
only of the national diversity of symbolic rights and duties, but also of their
substantial, though informal impact on constituting political arenas for the
bargaining of specific investors. In this respect,19 it should have passed.
                                             
18 H ÄBERLE (1999: 24), a public law specialist, resumes: “The success story of the preamble
of the German Constitution is rightfully often praised.”
19  There are, however, other perspectives. SCHMIDT/SPINDLER (1999) suggest that, in times of
crisis, the permission to opt out of a coherent and efficient national corporate governance
may well be used, even if it were inefficient in the long term.19
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